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CHAPTER 3 
Torts 
ROBERT E. KEETON 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§3.1. Negligence: Liability of suppliers and contractors. Twelve 
years ago in the leading case of Carter v. Yardley & CO.l the Supreme 
Jud~cial Court abandoned older notions requiring privity and held a 
manufacturer of perfume liable in tort to a remote vendee for negli-
g~nce in putting out a product that burned the plaintiff's skin. Com-
mendation is due the Court for preserving, during the 1958 SURVEY 
year'S1e potential value which Yardley may have in related situations. 
In herty v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.,2 the plain-
tiff com ained of injuries received when bags of asbestos fell on him, 
the pile of bags coming unbalanced as he reached to remove one from 
the top for loading on a freighter. The plaintiff was working for a 
stevedoring company; four days earlier the bags had been unloaded 
from railroad cars by the defendant railroad, and placed in a shed 
owned by a terminal company and occupied by a steamship line. The 
• pre-Yardley rule that a manufacturer or supplier was not liable to a 
remote vendee or other person with whom it had no contractual rela-
tion was subject to exceptions, one of which allowed liability for injury 
from an unsafe condition created incident to a delivery of materials by 
a seller, even though injury occurred after the seller had left the 
premises. Relying on both Yardley and cases establishing this excep-
tion to the pre-Yardley rule, the Supreme Judicial Court held the de-
fendant liable, although it was a carrier rather than a seller. The 
possibility of intervening negligence of the steamship line, which was 
in control of the asbestos and had allowed it to remain in unsafe con-
dition, was held not sufficient to relieve the defendant. 
Messina v. Richard Baird CO.B was another sequel to Yardley, but 
ROBERT E. KEETON is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. He is the author 
of Trial Tactics and Methods (1954), and co-editor of Seavey, Keeton and Keeton, 
Cases on Torts (1957). 
§3.l. 1 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693, 164 A.L.R. 559 (1946). 
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 733, 149 N.E.2d 670. 
B 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 233, 147 N.E.2d 805. For still another sequel to the Yardley 
case, see Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 575, 149 N.E.2d 635, 
decided for the defendant and distinguished from Yardley on the ground that there 
was evidence here of abnormal sensitivity of the plaintiff's skin to chemicals in a 
fingernail kit. 
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here also the Court found a ground for its decision independent of 
Yardley. The minor plaintiff, seven or eight years of age, in passing 
through the rear doorway of the house owned by her parents tripped 
on a two-by-four nailed to the threshold by a workman who was in-
stalling an aluminum door pursuant to a contract between the owners 
and the defendant. Holding that the installation could have been 
found to be negligent, and that the work had not been accepted by the 
owners, complaints having been made by them, the Court observed 
that it need not determine whether the principle of Yardley affects 
older decisions which indicated that the owner's acceptance of the 
premises ended the contractor's responsibility. This express reserva-
tion suggests that the Court may, when the occasion arises, hold that a 
requirement of "privity" is as inappropriate in negligence claims 
against contractors as in those against manufacturers and suppliers; by 
doing so it would add another sound ruling in an area in which the 
Court's decisions have excelled. 
§3.2. Negligence: Insurance: Damage to mortgaged automobiles. 
In Bell Finance Co. v. Getter? the plaintiff finance company held an 
assignment from the conditional vendor of a vehicle which, while 
driven by the conditional vendee, was damaged in a collision caused 
by the defendant's negligence. The conditional vendee was not in 
default at the time of the accident, and it did not appear whether 
the amount of the debt was greater or less than the damage; in these re-
spects the case differed from Morris Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, 
Inc.,2 in which the Supreme Judicial Court had allowed a conditional 
vendor to recover from a third person who negligently damaged the 
automobile. These differences were held to be immaterial, and the 
plaintiff was awarded the full amount of the damage, with the under-
standing that any surplus above the debt would be held for the condi-
tional vendee. The opinion indicates that mortgages and conditional 
sales are to be treated alike in regard to the present problem. 
Getter did not involve contributory negligence, and left open the 
question whether recovery in excess of the debt would be allowed in 
a case in which the conditional vendee or mortgagor was contributorily 
negligent. Answering this question in Harvard Trust Co. v. Racheo-
tes,3 the Supreme Judicial Court limited the recovery to the amount of 
the debt, since if "Harvard can recover anything in excess of the debt 
we would be permitting [the mortgagor] to accomplish indirectly what 
he could not accomplish directly" because of his contributory negli-
gence. 
More debatable is the question as to whether there should have been 
any recovery in Racheotes. The suit was being pressed in Harvard's 
name but for the interest of its subrogee, the collision insurer, from 
whom the mortgagor had obtained a collision policy for the benefit of 
§3.2. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 305, 147 N.E.2d 815. See further discussion of the 
problems treated in this section in §7.2 infra. 
2323 Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 889 (1948). 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309. 147 N.E.2d 817. 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1958 [2012], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1958/iss1/7
34 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §3.2 
both the mortgagor and the mortgagee. The balance outstanding on 
the debt was $318; the cost of repairing the car was $506.11; the in-
surer issued a check in the amount of $456.11 payable to Harvard and 
the mortgagor, and it was endorsed over to the repairman. The Court 
reasoned that the insurer should recover $318 as subrogee to the mort-
gagee's claim. But what was the nature of the mortgagee's claim? 
That is, what would have been the rights of the various parties, inci-
dent to the mortgagee's claim, in the absence of insurance? 
1. Rights of the parties in the absence of insurance. Before Racheo-
tes it had been decided that the mortgagee or conditional vendor can 
recover against the negligent third party despite contributory negli-
gence of the mortgagor or conditional vendee.4 After such a recovery, 
what is the status of the debt? Only three possibilities can be sug-
gested: (I) the mortgagee still retains the debt, thus enabling him to 
obtain double payment if the debtor is solvent; or (2) the negligent 
third party's payment to the mortgagee has discharged the debt pro 
tanto, thus enabling the debtor to obtain indirectly a benefit he could 
not obtain directly because of his contributory negligence; or (3) the 
negligent third party is entitled to receive any sum which can be col-
lected on the debt. The first choice unjustly enriches the mortgagee, 
by giving him double payment. The second unjustly enriches the 
mortgagor.1I The third is the best choice. As between the two negli-
gent drivers, it places the ultimate legal responsibility in the same 
place, irrespective of mortgages and conditional sales; yet it gives the 
non-negligent mortgagee or conditional vendor a claim against the 
negligent third party to protect itself against the risk of nonpayment 
by the debtor. Thus the mortgagee's claim against the third party is 
good only for shifting to the latter the risk of financial irresponsibility 
of the mortgagor, and is not good for an added benefit to either the 
mortgagee or the mortgagor. 
Whatever we may call it - a security interest, an interest in prop-
erty, or a chose in action - the mortgagee's interest which is harmed 
by the third party's negligence is an interest intended only as security 
for payment of a debt. The amount remaining due on the debt is a 
measure of the maximum possible harm done to the mortgagee's in-
terest. The actual harm will be less if subsequently the debtor makes 
some payment or if something is realized from the remaining value of 
the damaged chattel. Nevertheless, if there is uncertainty about the 
debtor's payment or the damaged chattel's value, it would be unfair to 
the mortgagee to make his award against the negligent third party less 
than the sum remaining due on the debt, since it may finally turn out 
that he loses the entire amount still owed him. To insure that the 
mortgagee is not undercompensated for the loss caused by the negli-
4 Morris Plan Co. v. Hillcrest Farms Dairy, Inc., lI2l1 Mass. 452, 82 N.E.2d 889 
(1948) (involving conditional sale). That a mortgage is to be similarly treated is in-
dicated in the Gefter case, discussed in text supported by note I supra. 
5 Note that a reason given by the Court in Racheotes for disallowing any recovery 
in excess of the debt was that the mortgagor would then obtain indirectly a re-
covery he could not obtain directly. 
, 
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gent third party, it is sound to measure the amount of the mortgagee's 
recovery by the sum outstanding on the debt. But, to insure that the 
negligent third party is not required to pay more than compensation,..; 
it is a necessary corollary that when he pays the full sum to the mort-
gagee, he becomes the beneficial owner of whatever value remains in 
the mortgagee's security interest. This legal relation may be described 
as an instance of subrogation, in which the third party's payment to 
the mortgagee entitles him to sue on the mortgagee's claim in debt 
against the mortgagor. Or it may be said that any further recovery by V 
the mortgagee against the mortgagor is held in trust for the third 
party, who has fully compensated the mortgagee. Also, the legal rela-
tion may be thought of as one of forced purchase, analogous to that 
which the action of trover imposes upon one whose tortious damage to a 
chattel is so severe as to amount to conversion; the tort-feasor must pay 
a sum equal to the full value of the interest in an undamaged condi-
tion, but in return the judgment vests in him the title to the interest in 
its damaged condition. Thus, if the mortgagor is financially responsi-
ble, the third party will recover on the debt and the mortgagor will be ,j 
left with his damaged chattel; the ultimate loss will fall on the mort-
gagor as would have been true if there had been no mortgage. 
Parenthetically, it may be noted that prior to Racheotes the Court 
had not been required to choose among these three possibilities as to 
what effect the mortgagee's recovery against the third party has upon 
the debt. It is easy to imagine why the point had not been presented 
for decision. A mortgagee would ordinarily sue on the claim more 
easily established - the debt - except when the debtor is not finan-
cially responsible, and in that case the negligent third party would not 
ordinarily bother to preserve and press a potential claim as the mort-
gagee's subrogee. 
2. Rights of the parties when the mortgagee and mortgagor have 
joint collision insurance. It is conceded in Racheotes that the insurer 
can recover only as subrogee of the mortgagee, and if the foregoing 
analysis is correct, the mortgagee's claim is not one by which the result 
of placing the ultimate loss on the negligent third party can be 
reached. Yet that is the result reached in Racheotes, unless after the 
judgment for the insurer against Racheotes, the latter still has a sub-
rogation claim on the debt against the mortgagor. This possibility 
surely would not be conceded, since it would result in loss by the 
mortgagor, who would then have received no net benefit from his own 
collision insurance, unless in turn he were allowed to complete the 
circle by recovering again from the insurance company. 
There is a second ground for criticism of Racheotes, entirely in-
dependent of the foregoing analysis. The mortgage included an 
assignment by the mortgagor of the insurance proceeds not exceeding 
the unpaid balance of the debt, and an agreement that the insurance 
proceeds would be paid to the mortgagee to be "applied" to the unpaid 
balance of the debt.6 N either the opinion nor the record contains a 
61958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 809-810, 147 N.E.2d 817, 818. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1958 [2012], Art. 7
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1958/iss1/7
36 1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §3.2 
copy of the insurance policy; stipulations make it apparent, however, 
that the insurer was aware of the mortgagee's interest, and perhaps also 
inserted in the policy a loss payable clause providing for payment to 
the mortgagee "as its interest may appear." Thus it would be in-
consistent with the policy obligations as well as the mortgage to make 
payment otherwise than to the mortgagee to be "applied" to the un-
paid balance of the debt. Of course the insurer, mortgagor and mort-
gagee are free to, and often do, agree on another form of payment, as 
they did in this case by using a check payable jointly to mortgagee and 
mortgagor, which was then applied toward the repair bill. But such 
an arrangement as to manner of payment, agreed upon after loss, 
should not give rise to a claim against the negligent third party which 
would not have been available if the manner of payment had been 
that provided in the combined terms of the mortgage and the insurance 
policy. If the proceeds had been paid as those documents provided, 
then the debt would have been fully discharged; the insurance pro-
ceeds exceeded the unpaid balance, and "applied" surely means "ap-
plied toward discharge" since any other meaning would leave the 
mortgagor owing further payment even if the proceeds were "ap-
plied" to the debt rather than being used to pay the repair bill. Thus, 
because of the discharge of the debt, the mortgagee would be fully 
compensated and would have no further claim for harm to his security, 
and there would then be no basis for the insurer's subrogation claim. 
It is not an adequate answer to argue that we should allow the in-
surer-subrogee to assert the claim that existed just before it made pay-
ment. That would be giving the payment the effect of purchasing an 
assignment of the claim, rather than the declared effect of being ap-
plied to the unpaid balance of the debt. It would leave the debt out-
standing; the mortgagor would still owe the full balance to the mort-
gagee (or its subrogee), and would be holding a damaged car with no 
fund to repair it, since we are now assuming that payment has been 
made to the mortgagee as provided in the documents, and not to the 
repairman. The effect of allowing the insurer its alleged subrogation 
claim would thus be to cause the mortgagor to receive no net benefit 
from the insurance. It would be treating him as if he were not an in-
sured - as if the policy had been insurance of the mortgagee's interest 
only. If the negligent third party had been named as an additional 
insured, it would never have been argued that the insurer should have 
a subrogation claim against him. In a sense, that is the effect of the 
agreement that proceeds will be applied to the unpaid balance of the 
debt; the agreement is one for the discharge pro tanto of the debt and 
all other claims dependent upon the debt. 
The foregoing criticisms of Racheotes may be regarded as essentially 
doctrinal in character. If that be a detraction, however, they are fully 
supported on grounds of public policy as well, even without resort to 
the view sometimes urged 7 that subrogation is generally undesirable. 
7 See, e.g., James, Indemnity, Subrogation and Contribution and the Efficient 
Distribution of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360 (1958). 
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If subrogation is to be justified, it is upon the bases that it reduces in-
surance costs by reducing insurance losses, and that it carries out the 
theme that insurance should effect indemnity only, by allowing the in-
surer to capitalize on other rights for indemnification of the insured 
loss rather than leaving an insured to profit by recovering twice. In 
this instance, it is plain both that denial of subrogation will not cause 
anyone to recover more than he lost, and that any saving on collision 
insurance rates which results from allowing subrogation will be ex-
ceeded by an increase of liability insurance rates because of adminis-
trative costs incurred and losses paid by the liability insurers of persons 
occupying the position of the negligent third party. 
It is to be hoped that at the first opportunity the Court will recon-
sider the rule of Racheotes in the light of factors which appear not to 
have been fully argued to the Court before its decision on this $318 
claim. 
§3.3. Negligence: Insurance brokers. In Rayden Engineering 
Corp. v. Church} the plaintiff corporation sued a firm of insurance 
brokers for their failure to obtain a policy of insurance against ac-
cidental death of a key employee. About six weeks after the brokers' 
representative had said that he would "take care of it," the key em-
ployee was killed in an automobile accident. No application had been 
signed and no premium paid; the brokers took no steps toward obtain-
ing a policy, and did not notify the plaintiff corporation that further 
action by it and the key employee would be required before a policy 
could be issued. The Supreme Judicial Court observed that a princi-
pal-agency relationship was established, imposing upon the brokers a 
duty to proceed in accordance with instructions and to report what was 
being done, and that there was evidence from which the jury could 
have found that the plaintiff exercised due care and that the brokers 
were negligent. But a majority of the Court denied recovery on the 
ground that the plaintiff had failed to adduce proof that the brokers' 
negligence was a cause of substantial damage to the plaintiff, and that 
the plaintiff should not have a second chance to do so in a new trial. 
It was considered speculative whether a policy would have been issued 
and what terms a policy would have had if issued; there is no standard 
accident form and most companies require applications, including 
questions about health and habits, answers to which might have led to 
refusal to issue a policy. 
The division of opinion on the Court is not surprising in view of 
the borderline quality of the evidence that a policy covering the death 
would have been in effect at that time if due diligence had been ex-
ercised by the brokers. But insofar as the majority decision is based on 
the idea that the plaintiff should not have a second chance to show 
that it sustained more than nominal damages, it is subject to the criti-
cism that it denied recovery on a purely procedural ground. Of course 
the problem is one of weighing the full cost of a new trial, including 
§3.3. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 965, 151 N.E.2d 57. See further discussion of this 
case in §18.1 infra. 
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the burden it casts upon the courts and the opposing party, against 
the risk of denying a substantively valid claim. If that risk is not sub-
stantial, the denial of a new trial is warranted. But in situations such 
as the Church case, involving moderately unusual facts and legal issues, 
the risk of denying a valid claim is often substantial, and courts should 
be somewhat more lenient in granting a new trial than in cases in-
volving run-of-the-mill fact situations.2 
§3.4. Negligence: Construction of statutes: Left turns. Kretz-
schmar v. Boisjolie1 involved an intersection collision which occurred 
as plaintiff was making a left turn from a one way street. There were 
verdicts for the defendants, the plaintiff having excepted to the portion 
of the judge's charge which stated that one who is approaching for a 
left turn "shall do so in the line of traffic to the right of and nearest to 
the center line of the roadway and the left turn shall be made by pass-
ing to the right of the center line of the entering way." Plaintiff 
argued that in making a left turn from a one way street one is not re-
quired to stay on the right side of the center line of the one way street. 
The Supreme Judicial Court observed that the charge was in the 
language of C.L., c. 90, §14, as effective in 1952, and that since the 
statute made no exception the trial court did not err in refusing to in-
struct that it did not apply to one way streets. In the face of such in-
tolerably literal construction, it is only small comfort that the statute 
was amended in 1957, prior to the Kretzschmar decision, to provide 
especially for a left turn from a one way street.2 Even now, no special 
provision has been made for a left turn from a two way street into a 
one way street. If a similarly literal approach is used in construing 
the 1957 act, the law still commands that a driver perform the patently 
useless and often dangerous maneuver of crossing to the far side of the 
one way street rather than making his left turn into the traffic lane on 
the near side.3 
2 Another opinion illustrative of the Court's use of procedural grounds for dis-
position of cases is McNair v. Fraher, 336 Mass. 458, 146 N.E.2d 484 (1957). It ap-
peared that the plaintiff, an eighteen-year.old girl with no operator's license and 
little training in the operation of vehicles, was driving because the defendant was 
tired. It was argued that the defendant was grossly negligent in not supervising her 
driving. One ground for the decision against the plaintiff was that the automobile 
was not operated by the defendant, whereas the declaration alleged that "she was 
riding in an automobile operated by the defendant" and "that as a result of the 
gross negligence of the defendant in the operation of said automobile" she was 
injured. 
§3.4. 1336 Mass. 382, 145 N.E.2d 919 (1957). 
2 Acts of 1957, c. 166. 
3 Another decision, Souza v. Torphy, 336 Mass. 584, 147 N.E.2d 157 (1958), though 
less clearly subject to criticism than the one discussed above, also appears to repre-
sent an unduly rigid approach to statutory construction, and in this instance to 
construction of precedents as well. The plaintiff alleged injuries from falling on 
ice that had accumulated on a sidewalk adjacent to the property of the defendant's 
testator, and that the notice required by G.L., c. 84, §21, as it stood in 1954, was not 
given "as a result of the conduct and statements of the defendant's testator, ..• 
made ... for the purpose of inducing plaintiff to forbear giving written notice." 
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§3.5. Negligence: Injuries from falling. The tort cases reaching 
the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1958 SURVEY year included a 
substantial number involving falls resulting from missteps of one kind 
or another, including slipping and tripping. In most instances neither 
the type of facts nor the nature of the legal issues was novel. Perhaps 
the most interesting of these cases, aside from one in which the plain-
tiff was misled by the advice of three law students,l was Underhill v. 
Shactman.2 The plaintiff stepped out of an automobile sideways and 
backwards onto what she thought was a curb. Actually it was a retain-
ing wall, with a drop of over four feet on the opposite side, over which 
she fell. The parking area of the Chestnut Hill Shopping Center, 
where this incident occurred, was maintained by a group of trustees, 
from whom a department store, patronized by plaintiff, leased a build-
ing in the shopping center. The Supreme Judicial Court held that 
there was no error in directing a verdict for the department store, since 
it had no control over the offending condition, but that the claim 
against the trustees should have been submitted to the jury. The 
trustees argued that they were absolved because the dangerous condi-
tion existed at the time of the letting to the department store. The 
Court regarded this, however, as a case in which the landlord went 
beyond mere retention of control of common passageways and ex-
tended an invitation on their own account and for their own purposes; 
the trustees had taken steps to attract persons to the shopping center, 
and had leased buildings in the center for rentals based upon a per-
centage of receipts. Also, the Court held that a jury could find that 
the trustees were negligent in not providing a protective railing or 
warning. 
§3.6. Negligence: Res ipsa loquitur. In Poulin v. H. A. Tobey 
Lumber Corp.1 the Supreme Judicial Court permitted a finding of 
negligence against the defendant upon evidence that, as a lumber truck 
wholly within the defendant's control rounded a corner, a rope holding 
the load broke and a piece of flying lumber struck the plaintiff. In 
Considering itself coerced by the precedent of prior decisions, despite the distinction 
that such decisions involved municipalities, against which waiver and estoppel 
would be unavailable, the Supreme Judicial Court held that allegations of waiver 
and estoppel were immaterial because the statute did not merely require notice as 
a condition precedent to enforcing a common law action against a private person 
but changed the nature of the action to one which has no existence in the absence 
of notice. 
§3.5. 1 Gill v. Carrier, 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 581, 149 N.E.2d 632. The plaintiff 
testified that while crossing the grounds of the State House, she met three law stu-
dents who advised her that steps leading up from Derne Street, which she knew had 
been blocked off during repairs, were again open to the public. For injuries sus· 
tained from a fall at the foot of the steps she brought an unsuccessful suit against 
the contractor. -
21958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1045, 151 N.E.2d 287. This case is also discussed supra 
§l.l. 
§3.6. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 391, 148 N.E.2d 277. 
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Brady v. Great A. and P. Tea CO.,2 an inference of actionable negli-
gence was permitted upon evidence that a nine-months-old child fell 
when a strap broke away from one side of a shopping carriage, fur-
nished by the defendant, as the child's mother was standing at the 
"empties" counter to get a refund. In DiRoberto v. Lagasse3 the 
necessary inference was permitted upon evidence that the plaintiff was 
injured by the collapse of an awning attached to a booth at a church 
carnival, that no one was on or about the roof of the booth, that the 
booth was not crowded, that little or no rain had occurred, and that 
the booth was owned and maintained by the defendant. 
The phrase "res ipsa loquitur" appears in only one of these opinions 
(Brady) and then only in a quotation from the trial court's charge. 
One may infer that the Supreme Judicial Court is deliberately follow-
ing this course to emphasize the fact that these decisions are based upon 
reasoned inferences from evidence and not upon special dispensations 
which might be thought to attach to an exotically named doctrine.4 
This sensible approach makes it unnecessary to be concerned about 
whether borderline cases are within or without the scope of res ipsa 
10quitur.5 
§3.7. Negligence: Exoneration by parking ticket: Fraud. In King 
v. Motor Mart Garage Co.,! the plaintiff sought damages for injury to 
an automobile stored with the defendant for hire, and for loss of per-
sonal property stolen from it. She testified that after giving notice 
that property of substantial value was in the car, and receiving assur-
ances about its safety, she was in the act of backing the car into a park-
ing space when an attendant asked her to sign a form, saying "We have 
to have a record of all locked cars." She signed, without reading, a 
paper stating that all personal property was left at her sole risk. When 
she called for the car the following day, the right vent was broken and 
2336 Mass. 386, 145 N.E.2d 828 (1957). 
8336 Mass. 309, 145 N.E.2d 834 (1957). 
4 This policy has been pursued previously by the Court. See 1957 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §13.4. 
5 An example of such a borderline case is Flaherty v. New York, New Haven & 
Hartford R.R., 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 733, 149 N.E.2d 670, in which the Court per-
mitted an inference of the defendant's negligence to be drawn from evidence that 
the defendant unloaded five thousand bags of asbestos weighing 125 pounds apiece 
into a shed, and that a few days later when the plaintiff approached to move them 
they fell on him as a result of being stacked insecurely and contrary to accepted 
practice. There was no evidence of intermeddling during the intervening period 
and the Court held it a reasonable inference that the defendant put them in the 
condition in which the plaintiff found them, since it is unlikely that anyone 
would take them down and restack them in the same place. See comment on this 
case in §3.1 supra. Another example is Harrington v. Central Greyhound Lines, 
Inc., 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1191, 1192, 146 N.E.2d 483, 484. "While it is said that 
the mere occurrence of a rear end collision of vehicles on a highway is no evidence 
of negligence ... the circumstances of the collision may create a reasonable in-
ference based on common experience that it would not have occurred if the opera-
tor of the colliding vehicle had been careful." 
§3.7. 1336 Mass. 422, 146 N.E.2d 365 (1957). 
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the personal property was mIssmg. Allowing a judgment for the 
plaintiff, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the evidence warranted 
findings that the attendant accepted not only the automobile but also 
its contents for storage, that the defendant was negligent, and that the 
"release" was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation as to its con-
tents, in circumstances where the party signing it did so without read-
ing it, relying on that misrepresentation. 
§3.8. Gross negligence: Guests. Several cases decided during the 
1958 SURVEY year involved the question as to whether the evidence 
offered would support a finding of gross negligence. In Doherty v. 
Spano,1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that while speed alone was 
not enough to prove gross negligence, and driving with one arm on the 
back of the front seat behind the l7-year-old girl whom defendant had 
offered a ride home at about midnight was not enough, "these things 
in combination, together with the fact that on four or five occasions 
within the period of a minute the defendant turned to talk to the 
plaintiff," presented a question for the jury. 
In Tompkins v. Pratt 2 a finding of gross negligence was held to be 
warranted by evidence that the defendant approached a blind corner 
on the left of the road and in a path from which, because of parked 
cars on his left and moving traffic on his right, he was unable to turn, 
and at a speed (30 to 35 miles an hour) that prevented him from mak-
ing a sudden stop. 
But compare these cases with Lalumiere v. Kiele.3 The plaintiff 
testified that he twice told the defendant to slow down because of ice 
and snow and the bad condition of the steering wheel, and each time 
the defendant, a professional musician, replied that he had to get to 
a club in another town to see a singer before she left. While proceed-
ing at 45 m.p.h. on a straightaway, the car skidded and crashed. A 
majority of the Supreme Judicial Court held that the "additional 
factors" of "the warnings of the plaintiff and the defendant's answers" 
did not distinguish the case from earlier decisions holding that "driv-
ing at an unreasonable speed does not constitute gross negligence." A 
formulation based on finding additional factors besides speed is likely 
to be misleading; speed is always relative to the circumstances. In 
Lalumiere itself there were icy roads, limited visibility, and prior skid-
ding. Why are these less significant than the additional factors in 
Doherty of the defendant's turning to talk with the plaintiff and put-
ting his arm behind her, and the additional factors in Tompkins of ap-
proaching a blind corner while unable to swerve because of parked 
cars on the left and moving traffic on the right? While comparison of 
a catalogue of additional factors is useful, the underlying distinction is 
that the conduct in Doherty and Tompkins was somewhat more serious 
than that in Lalumiere, when judged by the degree of risk and in-
difference to it. Note the language in Tompkins: "His act was de-
§3.8. 1336 Mass. 576, 146 N.E.2d 671 (1958). 
2336 Mass. 672,147 N.E.2d 536 (1958). 
31958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 605,149 N.E.2d 365. 
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liberate and so plainly involved danger to others that a jury would be 
warranted in finding such indifference to legal duty on his part as to 
constitute gross negligence." 4 
Bogley v. Burkholder5 arose under the distinctive Massachusetts rule 
that one who enters upon a gratuitous undertaking for the benefit of 
another owes the other only a duty to refrain from gross negligence.6 
The plaintiff and the defendant, truck drivers, were at a terminal on 
work for their respective employers. It was the plaintiff's duty to close 
the rear doors of a trailer, and this could not be done without moving 
the trailer. The defendant connected his tractor to the trailer and 
moved it; during efforts to separate the tractor and trailer the tractor 
ran over the plaintiff's leg. On evidence considered sufficient for a 
finding of ordinary but not gross negligence, the plaintiff lost. The 
Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that the defendant entered the un-
dertaking only as an accommodation and that, no relevant trade 
custom among truckers having been proved, the prospect that the de-
fendant would receive similar aid in the future was too conjectural to 
bring the case within the rule imposing liability for ordinary negli-
gence because of some business advantage to the defendant. 
§3.9. Fraud: Statute of Frauds. In Middlesex County National 
Bank v. Redd Auto Sales, Inc.,! the trial judge found that an agent of 
the defendant, a dealer in new and used automobiles, willfully mis-
represented to the plaintiff bank that one Rideout had bought a used 
car from the defendant for $595, making a down payment of $200, 
and desired to finance the balance. In fact the purchase price was $495 
and the down payment was $75 or $100. The trial judge also found 
that the "defendant knew that the plaintiff would not finance a cus-
tomer unless he had made a down payment of one third of the purchase 
price," 2 and that the plaintiff had relied upon the representations in 
granting the loan. The representations were oral, and the defendant 
pleaded the statute of frauds, G.L., c. 259, §4,3 derived from Lord 
Tenterden's Act.4 Considering itself bound by precedents,5 the Su-
4336 Mass. 672, 673,147 N.E.2d 536, 537 (1958). 
[) 1958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 507, 149 N.E.2d 143. 
6 This is a minority view, except in so far as it has been adopted by statutes per· 
taining to automobile guests. See, e.g., Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 76 N.W.2d 
660,56 A.L.R.2d 1090 (1956); 38 Am. Jur., Negligence §17. 
§3.9. 1336 Mass. 727, 147 N.E.2d 790 (1958). See §4.6 infra for further comment 
on this case. 
2336 Mass. at 728, 147 N.E.2d at 791. 
3 "No action shall be brought to charge a person upon or by reason of a repre-
sentation or assurance made concerning the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade 
or dealings of any other person, unless such representation of assurance is made in 
writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by some person thereunto 
by him lawfully authorized." 
4 The history of the statute is reviewed in Walker v. Russell, 186 Mass. 69, 71 
N.E. 86 (1904). 
[) See, e.g., Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 71 F. Supp. 598 (D. Mass. 1947); 
Cauman v. Biggar, 251 Mass. 91, 146 N.E. 230 (1925); Swann v. Phillips, 8 Ad. &: El. 
457, ll2 Eng. Rep. 912 (K.B. 1838). 
11
Keeton: Chapter 3: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
§3.10 TORTS 43 
preme Judicial Court held for the defendant, on the ground that the 
statute of frauds was a bar. 
The decision may be justified because of the close analogy to prior 
cases. But the Court intimated that it might have reached a contrary 
result were the question one of first impression. This intimation of 
disaffection for broad application of the statute suggests that, except 
within the range of close analogy to precedents, the Court is not likely 
to accept the notion that a mantle of immunity is drawn over a whole 
set of oral representations intended to induce an extension of credit to 
another if in some aspect they concern his "character, conduct, credit, 
ability, trade or dealings." 
§3.10. False imprisonment. In Morrill v. Hamel 1 the plaintiff 
sued two deputy tax collectors for false imprisonment. The plaintiff 
was on active duty with the Air Force, and was in uniform at his home 
in the city of Newburyport when the defendants appeared with a tax 
warrant issued by the city tax collector instructing them to collect the 
excise tax on the plaintiff's automobile and failing that to arrest him. 
After the plaintiff informed them that he did not have the money, they 
arrested and held him in jail until military representatives from the 
plaintiff's Air Force base came and paid the tax. The plaintiff claimed 
exemption from arrest on this warrant because of the Soldiers' and 
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.2 In holding for the defendants, the 
Supreme Judicial Court rested its decision on the broad principle that 
an officer is bound only to see that the process is in regular form and 
issues from one having jurisdiction of the subject. 
Tellefsen v. FeeS was urged as a precedent against the result reached 
in Morrill. In that case the plaintiff was master of a Norwegian vessel 
docked in Boston. He was arrested under a writ issued out of the 
Boston Municipal Court upon a claim by a member of his crew for 
back wages. A treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of 
Sweden and Norway provided that disputes between the captain and 
crew of vessels of the signatory nations should be adjusted before their 
respective consulates. The majority opinion recognized the rule that 
if the writ is issued "from a court of general jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter," the arrest is not rendered unjustifiable by "irregularities 
making the process voidable"; also, it recognized that in Tellefsen the 
Municipal Court of Boston had general jurisdiction over the subject 
matter.4 But it nevertheless held for plaintiff on the ground that be-
fore making the arrest the officer was informed of facts from which he 
was bound to know the law that the Municipal Court had no jurisdic-
tion over the particular controversy between the parties, and no juris-
diction over their persons, because of the treaty.5 Tellefsen might 
have been distinguished from Morrill on the ground that the Soldiers' 
§3.l0. 11958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 325, 148 N.E.2d 283. 
250 Appendix U.S.C. §§501-590 (1952). 
S 168 Mass. 188,46 N.E. 562, 45 L.R.A. 481 (1897). 
4168 Mass. 188, 193, 194,46 N.E. 562, 564, 565. 
5168 Mass. 188,194-196,46 N.E. 562, 565. 
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and Sailors' Civil Relief Act does not affect jurisdiction but merely 
provides for suspension and delay of proceedings. The Court did not, 
however, make this distinction; rather, it noted that in a previous 
Massachusetts opinion Tellefsen had been described as an "excep-
tional" rule for "very unusual circumstances" 6 and that Prosser had 
cited Tellefsen as a minority view.7 Thus it appears doubtful that the 
Court would now follow Tellefsen even in the "exceptional" circum-
stances it involved, and at the least Tellefsen is to be narrowly re-
stricted. The Court observed that the effect of its decision in Morrill 
is that interpretation and enforcement of the federal act will rest with 
courts, determination of claims of false arrest will not be dependent 
upon conversations between the process server and the taxpayer, and 
officers will not be dissuaded by fear of personal liability from serving 
a valid warrant.8 
B. LEGISLATION 
§3.1l. Actions for death. Heretofore, Chapter 229 of the General 
Laws, concerning actions for death, has had separate sections for claims 
for death from a defective way (§l), death of a passenger or other non-
employee caused by negligence, etc., of a railroad or street railway 
(§2A), death of a passenger by negligence, etc., of other common carriers 
of passengers (§2), death of an employee (§2B), and other deaths caused 
by negligence, etc. (§2C). Chapter 238 of the Acts of 1958 consolidates 
former Sections 2, 2A, and 2C. The new Section 2 applies generally 
to claims for death, except claims against the employer of the deceased 
(as to which Section 2B remains in effect) and claims for death from a 
defective way (as to which Section 1 remains in effect). Other sections 
of Chapter 229 are amended to conform, and amended Section 6E pro-
vides that the amount of recovery under Section 2B, like that under 
new Section 2, shall be not less than $2000 nor more than $20,000. 
§3.12. Actions for personal injury: Admissibility of medical and 
hospital bills. Chapter 323 of the Acts of 1958 adds Section 79G to 
G.L., c. 233. The new section provides that in personal injury actions 
an itemized bill sworn to by the physician, dentist or authorized agent 
of the hospital rendering services shall be admissible as evidence of the 
fair and reasonable charge for such services. The bill shall not include 
references to the injury itself or to the history, and a notice given ten 
days before trial is required. The statute provides that it does not 
limit the right of the defendant to summon the witness at his own ex-
pense "for the purpose of cross examination with respect to such bill or 
6 See David v. Lorochelle, 296 Mass. 302, 305, 5 N.E.2d 571, 572 (1936). 
7 Prosser, Torts §25 n.68 (2d ed. 1955), cites Tellefsen as contrary to the assertion 
that "the weight of authority probably is that the officer is privileged to execute [a 
writ valid on its face] even though he has personal knowledge of facts which should 
prevent the arrest." 
81958 Mass. Adv. Sh. 325, 329,148 N.E.2d 283, 286. 
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record or to rebut the contents thereof, or for any other purpose," or 
to adduce other testimony regarding the bill or record. 
§3.13. Motor vehicle actions. Chapter 369 of the Acts of 1958 re-
peals the requirement that actions of tort arising out of the use of 
motor vehicles be commenced in the District Court and authorizes the 
Superior Court on its own motion or the motion of a party to transfer 
to a District Court a case in which, "if the plaintiff prevails, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that recovery will exceed one thousand dollars." 
A party aggrieved by the decision of the District Court may as of right 
have the case retransferred for determination by the Superior Court, 
the decision of the District Court being prima facie evidence on such 
matters as are put in issue by the pleadings. 
§3.14. X-ray machines for shoe-fitting. General Laws, c. Ill, §5C, 
inserted by Acts of 1956, c. 595, provides for the Department of Public 
Health to regulate the use of fluoroscopic shoe-fitting machines. Chap-
ter 79 of the Acts of 1958 amends G.L., c. III by repealing Section 5C 
and adding Section I 86A, providing that no person shall operate or 
maintain a shoe-fitting device which uses fluoroscopic, X-ray or radi-
ation principles, except for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes by or 
under the direction of a physician or chiropodist registered under the 
laws of the Commonwealth. 
§3.15. False imprisonment: Detention on suspicion of shoplifting. 
Chapter 337 of the Acts of 1958 amends G.L., c. 231 by adding Section 
94B, which gives a merchant and his authorized representatives a 
privilege to detain, "in a reasonable manner and for not more than a 
reasonable length of time," if there are "reasonable grounds to believe 
that the person so detained" was shoplifting. The act provides for a 
presumption of reasonable grounds for such belief if goods not pur-
chased are concealed by the person detained. Prior to this act, the 
merchant had a considerably narrower privilege.! 
§3.l5. 1 See, e.g., McDermott v. W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass. 736, 49 N.E.2d 115 
(1943); Comment, Shoplifting and the Law of Arrest: The Merchant's Dilemma, 
62 Yale L.J. 788 (1953). 
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